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COMMENTS
CONTRACTS-DURATION OF INDEFINITE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
THAT SPECIFY PERIOD OF PAY-Normally a contract which does not express a time for performance is treated as enforceable. The courts interpret it to require that performance be completed within a reasonable
time, basing their conclusion on a presumption of the intention of the
parties.1 However, in the area of employment contracts, an exception
to the reasonable time rule has developed. An indefinite contract for
services is generally held to be terminable at will. 2 The questions that
come to mind are two: What is" the basis for the unique treatment
of employment contracts? What are the manifestations of intent that
will defeat application of the terminable-at-will rule by making the contract definite?
·
This comment is _limited to the effect of a period of pay stated in
the contract for hire as evidencing an intent to make the period of service definite. The decided cases are in conflict.3 Also, previous analyses
of the problem have reached wholly opposite conclusions.4 Consequently, this discussion cannot do more than define present approaches
to th~ question and weigh the po,licy factors which enter into de~isions.

A. English Development
In England it was early held that a contract for services was presumed to last for one year in the absence of any. set duration. Lord
Coke expressed the presumption: "If a man retaine a servant generally
1 Frankfurt-Barnett Co. v. Prym Co., 150 C.C.A. 223, 237 F. 21 (1916); L.R.A. 1918A
602 at 609; Marsh v. Brown-Crummer Co., 138 Kan. 123, 23 P. (2d) 465 (1933); 88
A.L.R. 835 at 842 (1933); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §38, p. 102 (1936); 1 CoNTRACTS R:ssTATEMENT, §§30, 41, illus. 1 (1932)..
.
2 Christensen v. Pacific Coast Borax Co., 26 Ore. 302, 38 P. 127 (1894); Coffin v.
Landis, 46 Pa. 426 (1864); 1 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs, rev. ed., §39, p. -106 (1936); 2
AGENCY R:ssTATEMENT, §442, p. 1030, comment b (1933). A statutory provision is found
in some states: "In the absence of_ any agreement or custom as to the term of service, the
time of payment, or the rate, or value of wages, a servant is presumed to be hired by the
month, at a monthly rate of reasonable wages, to be paid when the service is performed."
This provision is found in the following: Cal: Lab. Code (Deering, 1937) §3002; Mont.
Rev. Codes (1935) §7796; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §34-0403; S.D. Code (1939) §17.0503.
3 Cases are collected at 11 A.L.R. 469 (1921); 100 AL.R. 828 (1936); 161 A.L.R.
711 (1946); 25 L.R.A. (n.s.) 529 (1910); 51 L.R.A. (n.s.) 629 (1914).
4 42 CoL. L. R:sv. 107 0942) ("majority rule" presumes a hiring for the pay period);
3.2 MicH. L. R:sv. 107 (1933); 14 ST. Lows L. R.Ev. 333 (1929) ("majority rule" presumes
a hiring at will).
·
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without expressing any time, the law shall construe it to be for one
yeare for that retainer is according to law."5 The presumption was applied to contracts in which no period of pay was expressed6 or in which
conflicting expressions of duration were found. 7 The reason that impelled the English courts to adopt the presumption of a hiring for a
year was stated by Blackstone: " ... if the hiring be general, without any
particular time limited, the law construes it to be a hiring for a year,
upon a principle of natural equity, that the servant shall serve, and the
master maintain _him throughout all the revolutions of the respective
seasons, as well when there is work to be done, as when there is not." 8
However, the statement of a pay period of less than a year was held
to be sufficient to rebut the presumption that the employment was to
last a year. 9 An alternative analysis found in the early cases is that the
expression of a pay period made the contract definite, preventing application of the presumption.10 It appears that the English courts gave
great weight to the stipulation of a pay period as indicating the intent
of the parties to establish a definite period for services.
Other exceptions to the presumption of a hiring for a year grew out
of custom. For instance, the hiring of a domestic servant for an indefinite term was terminable on a month's notice or on payment of a
month's wages.11
1 CoKE ON l.rrn.EToN 42b (1629).
Lilley v. Elwin, 11 Q.B. 742, 116 Eng. Rep. 652 (1848); Buckingham v. Canal Co.,
46 L.T. (n.s.) 885 (1882).
7Beeston v. Collyer, 4 Bing. 309, 130 Eng. Rep. 786 (1827) (expression of quarterly,
then monthly wages); Rex v. Great Yarmouth, 5 M. & S. 114, 105 Eng. Rep. 993 (1816)
(weekly wages coupled with a provision for monthly notice); Fawcett v. Cash, 5 B. & Ad.
904, 110 Eng. Rep. 1026 (1834) (yearly salary payable monthly).
s 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 425 (1773). An alternative reason, suggested by
Macdonell, was that statutes had provided for hiring in certain types of employment to be for
one year. By judicial legislation, the one year rule was extended to cover hirings in general.
1 MACDONELL, MASTER AND SERVANT 167 (1883).
9 Rex· v. Warminster, 6 B. & C. 77, 108 Eng. Rep. 381 (1826). In Evans v. Roe, L. R.
7 C.P. 138 (1872), it was held th.at the expression in writing of a weekly wage established a
presumption of a weekly employment that could not be attacked by parol evidence of an
intention to contract for a year.
10 "But if the payment of weekly wage be the only circumstance from which the duration
of the contract is to be collected, it must be taken to be only a weekly hiring." Buller, J., in
Rex v. Newton Toney, 2 T.R. 453, 100 Eng. Rep. 244 (1788). The case was cited in Rex
v. Hampreston, 5 T.R. 205, 101 Eng. Rep. 116 (1793), and followed in Rex v. Pucklechurch,
5 East. 382,-102 Eng. Rep. 1116 (1804), and in Rex v. Mitcham, 12 East. 351, 104 Eng.
Rep. 137 (1810). A hiring "at a salary of two guineas a week for the first year" was held to
be a weekly hiring in Robertson v. Jenner, 15 L.T. (n.s.) 514 (1867).
u Moult v. Halliday, [1898] 1 Q.B. 125.
11
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In 1860 appeared the first case in whis:h the basic presumption was
attacked. In Fairman v. Oakford,1 2 the court upheld a trial judge's
refusal to instruct the jury that an indefinite hiring was a hiring for a
year. Supporting the decision, Judge Pollock stated, "From much experience of juries, I have come to the conclusion, that usually the indefinite hiring ·of a clerk is not a hiring for a year, but rather one determinable by three months' notice."13 The attack on the presumption
of fact continued down the years, until today it is safe to say the English
courts have reached a position compatible with the basic reasonable
time doctrine of the law of contracts. In the absence of expression or
custom to the contrary, the modem English cases hold that a contract
· for services is terminable upon a reasonable notice. 14 What is a reasonable notice is a question of fact, but it is recognized that the period of
pay is good evidence of that fact. 15 The rationale of the reasonable
time rule applied to employment contracts is that it affords both the employer and employee an opportunity tc;> adj~st to the termination of the
contract.16
B.

Historical Development in the United States

The early cases in the United States rejected the then prevailing
English presumption of a yearly hiring, on the basis tp.at our social
and economic conditions were substantially different. The courts presumed that an indefinite contract for employment was terminable at
will despite the statement of a pay period.17 Other courts adopted a presumption that the indication of a pay period set the duration of the
hiring.18
In 1877 the latter position was greatly weakened by_the publication
of a textbook by Wood which categorically stated: "With us the rule
is inflexible, that a gen'eral or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at
will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden
12 5 H. & N. 635, 157 Eng. Rep. 1334 (1860).
1a Id. at 636.
14 Wilson v. Ucelli, 45 T.L.R. 395 (1929); Savage British India Steam Nav. Co., 46
T.L.R. 294-(1930); Lowe v. Walter, 8 T.L.R. 358 (1892) (yearly salary stated).
15 Lowe v. Walter, 8 T.L.R. 358 (1892) Payzu, Ltd., v. Hannaford [1918] 2 K.B. 348
(weekly salary, week's notice, but daily salary, day's notice).
16 Lowe v. Walter, 8 T.L.R. 358 (1892).
·
17Martin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895). For cases expressly
rejecting the English rule, see Coffin v. Landis, 46 Pa. 426 (1864); Kansas Pac. Ry. v. Roberson, 3 Col. 142 (1876); Boogher v. Md. Life Ins. Co., 8 Mo. App. 533 (1880).
1s Newkirk v. N.Y. & Harlem Ry., 38 N.Y. 158 (1868) and Beach v. Mullin, 34 N.J.L.
343 (1870) expressly followed by Rex v. Newton Toney, supra, note IO.

v.

1949]

COMMENTS

83

is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week,
month, or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no
presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate
fixed for whatever time the party n:iay serve."19 In later years that quotation was criticized strongly because it was not supported by the cases
cited as its authority, 20 and because it did not recognize the existing
conflict in authorities.
The- statement made by Wood had far-reaching effects on the prob- ·
lem of determining the importance of a pay period as unveiling the intent of the parties. In many of the cases decided after 1877 the statement was cited21 or quoted22 in support of the-conclusion that a hiring
at will was to be presumed, despite the expression of a pay period.
As the basic problem was to determine the intent of the parties, some
courts refused to follow Wood's proposition, because it arbitrarily excluded part of the evidence available which might bear on the question
of intent. By the time the leading case of Maynard v. Royal Worcester
Corset Co. 23 was decided, the Massachusetts court was able to make the
statement that: "The unit of time used in describing the compensation
was one year. In many jurisdictions, this fact standing alone is regarded as sufficient evidence of the term of employment." 24

C.

Policies and Problems Today

The decided cases are in great confusion, both as to analysis and
result. Even within a single jurisdiction, there are instances of conflicting approaches. 25 In most of the opinions little is said about the
19WooD, MAsTER AND SERVANT, §134, p. 272 (1877).
20 11 A.L.R. 475-477 (1921).
2 1 Savanah F. & W. Ry. Co. v. Willett, 43 Fla. 311, 31 S. 246 (1901); Morris, Tasker
& Co. v. Agnew, 57 lli. App. 229 (1894); McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 67 Md. 554,
11 A. 176 (1887).
22 Martin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895); Greer v. Arlington
Mills Mfg. Co., 17 Del. 581 at 584 (1899).
23 200 Mass. 1, 85 N.E. 877 (1908).
24 Id. at 4.
2 5 Arkansas: Employment at an annual salary of $2,500 was held to measure only the
amount of compensation; the hiring was terminable at will in Haney v. Caldwell, 35 Ark.
156 (1879). But in Moline Lumber Co. v. Harrison, 128 Ark. 260 at 263, 194 S.W. 25
(1917), the court stated: " ••• for, where a unit of time is described in mentioning the compensation without any other reference to time, it is fairly inferrable that the parties intended
to contract for that period of time." Illinois: Orr v. Ward, 73 lli. 318 (1874) found a hiring
at an annual salary terminable at will. In Great Northern Hotel Co. v. Leopold, 72 lli. App.
108 (1897), the court presumed that the employment was to last for a pay period. Wisconsin:
An early case, Irish v. Dean, 39 Wis. 562 at 568 (1876) stated, " •.• if the contract is silent
as to its duration, either party may terminate it at pleasure by giving reasonable notice to the
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reason for adopting one set of presumptions over the other; the tendency
is to i;ely upon precedent.
_
The basic objective of the court is to determine the intent of the
parties concerning duration of the contract. In seeking that goal, the
courts have developeq. three approaches: (I) a hiring at will is presumed; (2) the jury decides the question of intent without the benefit
of any presumption; (3) a contract for at least one pay p_eriod is presumed. The validity of any presumption26 selected should depend upon policy factors rather than upon an assertion that any one approach
reflects the intent of the parties to a greater extent than its alternatives.
Until some fact survey has been made which shows the customary and
normal intent of the parties in such circumstances, the adoption of a
"fair" presumption begs the question. 27 If finding the intent of the
parties is the dominant objective, it is circular to argue that the presumpt;ion of intention derived from a written statement of the period of pay
cannot be attacked by parol e~dence of the actuaJ intent.28

(1) The legal consequence of the presumption of a hiring at will
is that the ell}ployment contract remains executory. 20 No rights or obother party of his intention to terminate it." Kellogg v. Citizens Ins. Co., 94 Wis. 554, 69

N.W. 362 (1896)~ said that the pay period was evidence for the jury which might "show an
intention of the employment duration. Another shift in Wisconsin decisions is illustrated by
Cronemillar v. Duluth-Superior Milling Co., 134 Wis. 248, 114 _N.W. 432 (1908), in which
the court said there was a presumption of a hiring for a pay period. The mosJ: recent develop-.
ment is found in Milwaukee Corrugating Co. v. Krueger, 184 Wis. 139, 198 N.W. 394
(1924), where the court adopted the presumption of a hiring at will, quoting Wood to support
its conclusion. See note 18, supra.
,
2 6 The term "presumption" is used to denote an inference of fact which must be drawn
from the statement of a pay period in a contract that has no·other indication of duration. By
its nature the inference is rebuttable.
2 7The decision in Edwards v. Seaboard & Roanoke Ry. Co., 121 N.C. 365, 28 S.E. 137
(1897), was based on the argument that if the parties had wanted to contract for one pay
period, they would have so stated. Cf. 1 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs, rev. ed., §39, p. 108
(1936): "It is, of course, possible that this mode of expression was merely to fuc the rate of
compensation, but in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it seems a fail; presumption that
the parties intended the employment to last at least for one such period." Hardman, "Contracts of Agency Without Stipulation as to Duration," 35 W.VA. L. Q. 116 at 121 (1929):
"It is believed that this inference of fact is based on the common experience (in the United
States at least) that, where reasonable persons enter into an agreement of employment and do
not stipulate as to duration, they do not normally understand that there is any definite
duration."
·
28 42 CoL. L. REv. 107 at 109, n. 12 (1942).
29 The following cases applied this presumption. Hay v. Pittsburg Lodge, 137 Pa.
Super. 205, 8 A. (2d) 434 (1939); Title Ins. Co. v. Howell, 158 Va. 713, '164 S.E. 387
(1932);·Amelotte v. Dold Packing Co., 173 Misc. 477, 17 N.Y.S. (2d) 929 (1940); Binnion
v. M. & D. Drugs, Inc., (La. 1942) 8 S. (2d) 307. The decisions were based on precedent
without argument. The position of the AGENCY REsTATEMENT is similar: "The fact that a
servant or other agent is employed under a contract which merely specifies a salary proport;ion-
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ligations are created under it until the employee has rendered services.
In effect it is nothing more than a series of offers for each day's employment. Can the presumption be justified? It militates against use of
the pay period as proof to show the intent of the parties, at least in the
absence of other evidence. Thus it restricts the factors to which the
court can look.
It has been argued that it is necessary to hold the contract terminable at will in order to prevent forfeiture of services performed by the
employee. The argument is that the employee must perform in full
to be entitled to any pay under a contract for a definite period. If he
breaches through no fault of his employer, he cannot recover even for
the services rendered. 30 To the extent that the courts are willing to give
quasi-contractual relief to a defaulting employee, and to the extent that
the courts are inclined to construe employment contracts as divisible,
the argument for the presumption is not valid. Moreover, the main
concern of the law should be for the employee who was fired, not for
the employee who quit. •The former is adequately protected even under
a definite contract.
If indefinite contracts for labor are presumed to be terminable at
will, the result will be to promote greater mobility in the labor market.
In the days of frontier expansion, this consideration probably had great
attractiveness. Today, however, the emphasis is on security of jobs.
It is clear that definite employment relationships would not be promoted
by the presumption of a hiring at will.

(2) The approach that places the question in the lap of the jury
for determination has the merit of considering all factors that may bear
on the question of intent. 31 It entrusts to the jury complete control
over interpretation of the contract.32 This procedure departs considerate to units of time which are commonly used for the purpose of accounting or payment,
such as a month or year, does not, of itself, indicate that the parties have agreed that the
employment is to continue for the stated unit of time. Such a specification merely indicates
the rate at which the salary is earned or is to be paid, and either party is privileged to terminate the relationship at any time unless further facts exist." 2 AGENCY R:EsTATEMENT, §442,
comment b (1933). The comment admits in following passages that the unit of time for
computing pay may be an indication of duration, if found in connection with "other relevant
facts."
SO Peacock v. Va.-Cal. Chemical Co., 221 Ala. 680, 130 S. 411 (1930), turned on this
argument.
,
31 Cudney v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 181 App. Div. 257, 168 N.Y.S. 268 (1917); Dennis v.
Thermoid Co., 128 N.J.L. 303, 25 A. (2d) 886 (1942).
.
s2 In Pryor v. Briggs Mfg. Co., 312 Mich. 476, 20 N.W. (2d) 279 (1945), the Michigan court said that t:Jie question of the effect of a pay period was a matter for the jury. The
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ably from the reasonable time inference generally applied in the law
of contracts; in addition, it results in greater uncertainty.

(3) Under the view that the statement of a pay period establishes a presumption of a hiring from period to period, the burden of
rebutting the definite contract is placed upon the party who has wrongfully terminated the relationship. 33 This seems to be the position taken
by the Contracts Restatement,34 and Professor Williston supports this
. view with the argument that courts ought to construe language found in
a contract 'to make it "give rise to a legal obligation."35 Several states
have adopted the presumption by statute.36
It is probably to the mutual advantage of both employer and worker
to perform under a bilateral contract for a definite term. By such a_
legal relationship, both parties are given a measure of security, in that
neither can terminate, without the consent of the other, except at the
end of a pay period. The right to fire for necessary reasons is no more
restricted under this presumption than it is under a definite contract for
·hire.
If security of tenure is to be the touchstone, the best rule would
be the English doctrine of reasonable notice. Of the three approaches
considered, however, the presumption of a hiring for a pay period is
statement was made to clarify an existing confusion on the point, but to support its conclusion,
the court cited the AGENCY RESTATEMENT. The dissent pointed out that the language of the
RllsTATBMBNT prevented the use of monthly wages, in itself, to show a hiring for a month.
33 Dallas Hotel v. Lackey, (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) 203 S.W. (2d) 557; Stifft Co. v.
Florsheim, 203 Ark. 1043, 159 S.W. (2d) 748 (1942); Knudsen v. Green, 116 Fla. 47, 156
S. 240 (1934); Alkire v. Alkire Orchard Co., 79 W.Va. 526, 91 S.E. 384 (1917).
341 CoNTRAcrrs RllsTATBMBNT, §32, illus. 2 (1932): "A promises B to serve him as a
chauffeur and B promises to pay him $100 a month. The full period for which the service is
expected to continue is not stated. There is at once a bilateral contract for a month's service.
It is often a difficult question of interpretation to determine whether an agreement specifies
merely a rate of compensation, or indicates, at least impliedly, an understanding that the employment shall continue for not less than one of the periods for which the rate is stated, in
which case there is a contract for one period, and at its expiration an offer for another in the
absence of revocation."
35 1 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrrs, rev. ed., §39, p. 108 (1936).
36 Cal. Lab. Code (Deering, 1937) §3001; Mont. Rev. Code (1935) §7795; S.D. Code
(1939) §17.0502, all provide that: "A servant is presumed to have been hired for such length
of time as the parties adopt for the estimation of wages. A hiring at a yearly rate is presumed
to be for one year; a hiring at a daily rate, for one day; a hiring by piece-work, for no definite
time." In Rosenberger v. Pac. Coast Ry. Co., 111 Cal. 313, 43 P. 963 (1896), the provision
was interpreted to mean that a hiring at a yearly salary payable monthly was a monthly
employment. N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §34-0402, provides: "Unless it is otherwise provided
in the contract of employment, the length of time for which a servant is hired shall be presumed, if he is hired: ••• (3) at a monthly rate, to be for one month; ••• (5) at a yearly rate,
to be for one year." Ga. Code (1933), §66-101 states: ''That wages are payable at a stipulated period raises the presumption that the hiring is for such period."
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substantially the same, except at the end of a pay period. At that time,
either party may terminate without notice.
In conclusion it can be said: (1) the basic problem is to ascertain
the intent of the parties; (2) the use of any presumption is an artificial
restriction on the free determination of that question, in the absence
of any factual survey•to show which inference is the "fair" one to make;
(3) the value of any given presumption must be judged in the light
of policy factors; and ( 4) the reasonable notice rule is the most valuable, if consistency in the law of contracts is a worthy objective.

Paul E. Anderson, S.Ed.

